Active Directory
- limit login of DAs to DCs only
- never run a service with DA privileges
- check out temporary group memberships (Can have TTL)
- disable account delegation for sensitive accounts (in ad usersettings)
- 4624: Account Logon
- 4634: Account Logoff
- 4672: Admin Logon (should be monitored on the dc)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4672} -MaxEvents 1 |Format-List -Property *
- 7045: A Service was installed in the system.
- 4673: Sensitive Privilege user (requires audit privileges)
- 4611: Trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority (requires audit privileges)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.message -like "*Kernel Mode Driver*"}
- 4657: Audit creating/Change of
HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehaviour
- 4657: Audit/creation of
HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SecurityPackages
There are no mitigations for kerberoasting so make sure the service accounts that have an spn associated have strong passwords and are changed regularly.
- 4769: A Kerberos ticket as requested, Filter: Name != krbtgt, does not end with $, not [email protected], Failure code is 0x0 (success), ticket encryption is 0x17 (rc4-hmac)
- 4662: Operation was performed on an object
- 5136: directory service object was modified
- 4670: permissions on an object were changed
- Enable SID Filtering
- Enable Selective Authentication (access between forests not automated)
- Traffic for DCs is mirrored to ATA Sensors (or installed on dc as service), activity profile is build
- Collects 4776 (credential validation of a user) to detect replay attacks, detects behavioral anomalies
- Detects: account enumeration, netsession enumeration, Brute Force, exposed cleartext credentials, honey tokens, unusual protocols, credential attacks (pth,ptt,ticket replay)
- Will NOT detect non existent users for golden ticket
- Detects DCSync, but not DCShadow
- Centralized password storage with periodic randomization, stored in computer objects in fields mc-mcsAdmPwd (cleartext), ms-mcs-AdmPwdExperiationTime
- Hardens against malware
- Run trusted code only, enforced in Kernel and Userspace (CCI, UMCI, KMCI)
- UEFI SEcure Boot protects bios and firmware
- Cannot use CredSSP & Wdigest (no more cleartext creds)
- NTLM Hash not cached
- Kerberos does not use DES or RC4
- Requires at least server 2008, need to test impact, no offline sign-on (no caching), useless for computers and service accounts
- Use hardened workstation for performing sensitive tasks
- Tier0: Domain Admins/Enterprise Admins
- Tier1: Significant Resource Access
- Tier2: Administrator for Workstations / Support etc.
- ESAE Enhanced Security Admin Environment
- Dedicated administrative forest for managing critical assets (forests are security boundaries)
Last modified 2yr ago